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ISSUES OF THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
 Õàë³àðî òàä³è³îòëàðíèíã íàçàðèé, óñëóáèé âà àìàëèé ìàñàëàëàðè 
 Âîïðîñû òåîðèè, ìåòîäîëîãèè è ïðàêòèêè
ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ èññëåäîâàíèé 
Gregory Gleason
Innovation and Continuity in American
Foreign Policy
Gregory Gleason is Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico.  Gleason also serves as
Professor of Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center.  The Marshall Center is
a partnership between the German Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense.  The
views represented in this article are personal views.
The  first principle  of foreign policy is simple  and straightforward.
The  goal of foreign policy is to  act so  as to  succeed in the  pursuit of the
country’s interest. Stating this goal is easy. But achieving this goal in
practice is often not so straightforward and simple. Achieving a country’s
interest, any country’s interest, may require complicated actions taken in
complex situations fraught with uncertainty about the outcomes and,
sometimes, confronting the possibility or even the reality that others may
not share the same goals and may seek to block or undermine the ac-
tions. So achieving a country’s interest may require actions artfully ac-
complished to avert risks and thwart challenges. At the same time, action
may require balancing, positioning and leveraging while reaching beyond
the easily attainable in order to grasp opportunities, whether they arise
as a result of dedicated work or whether they simply emerge as a coinci-
dence, a consequence of Fortuna.
Foreign policy is a sphere of politics, but it differs in important ways
from domestic politics. Domestic policies are focused on a state’s internal
dimensions and may be influenced by foreign factors such as trade or
security concerns. But the  focus of domestic policy remains on the  state’s
internal conditions. In contrast, foreign policy tends to be responsive to
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outside circumstances. In all states, in all times, in all circumstances
foreign policy tends to be outward-looking. Foreign policy is keyed to
the conditions and circumstances of the outside world. The attention of
those involved in formulating and conducting foreign policy is for the
most part oriented outward, focusing on the intentions and capabilities of
neighbors, partners, and adversaries located beyond the border.
In thinking about foreign policy, it is useful to regard policy as a line
of diplomatic action that can be  analyzed as either proactive or reactive.
Proactive  policy implies the  pursuit of objectives, leaning out in front of
the actions of other parties and sometimes even sometimes coming into
conflict with the policies of other parties, possibly before those parties
have taken any steps at all. Reactive implies a response to a situation that
has derived from an action taken by other parties or an action assumed to
be at some point taken by other parties. A reactive policy may be either
in furtherment of another party’s action or it may be  in opposition to
another party’s action. The distinction between proactive and reactive is
usually apparent merely from the sequence of actions, with proactive
steps being first in time. However, sometimes an action which appears to
be first in time may be considered reactive because it is taken in expec-
tation that some other party’s action is imminent or is in the process of
being planned or prepared. In other words, a preemptive action may be
taken first in time  so  as to  precede  an anticipated action, but because  it
is a preemptive reaction, it is still essentially reactive.
While foreign policy always tends to be more reactive that domestic
policy, there are variations which are a product of the state’s relations
with other state  parties. All states have  equal juridical status in terms of
international law, but nevertheless states are not equivalent from the
point of view of foreign policy capabilities. The great legal theorist Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645) classically defined the system of political entities as
states recognizing one another as independent, legitimate, sovereign and
juridically equal states subject to  principles of international law. Yet
even to  this day states have  different portfolios and different resources,
and thus are different in the ways they initiate actions and respond to
actions initiated by other states or parties. This asymmetry among states
leads to  another important principle  in practice: The  degree  to  which a
state is proactive in terms of foreign policy is proportional to the degree
to which the states is influential in the international community. The
more influential the state, the more its foreign policy tends to be proac-
tive. Similarly, the less influential the state, the more its foreign policy
tends to be reactive. A way of saying this in rough terms is that influential
states tend to lead while smaller states tend to follow.
G. Gleason
2
International Relations: Politics, Economics, Law, Vol. 2019 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://uzjournals.edu.uz/intrel/vol2019/iss1/5
53Xalqaro munosabatlar, 2019, ¹ 1.
Perspicuity is the  ability to  see  things accurately. Perspicuity is a
foremost characteristic of the  able  diplomat. The  more  perceptive  the
diplomat and analyst at seeing things as they are, the  more  effective  the
diplomat and analyst will be  at achieving analytical objectives. Sound
foreign policy is based on incisive insight into circumstances, events and
developments beyond a country’s borders. Understanding the intentions
and capabilities of others does not imply agreeing with them, but it does
mean objectively assessing them. This is important because strategy, for
any state in any set of circumstances, is conventionally defined as the
ability to bring means into line with ends. States have capabilities (means)
and ends (desires). A successful strategist is one who can, in the lan-
guage  of a celebrated aphorism, ensure  that “desires always coincide  with
means.”1
The immediate neighbors of Uzbekistan are of consequential interest
to  Uzbekistan in relation to  their importance  for commerce, security and
human connections. Other neighbors, both those close at hand and those
far away in terms of geography, are important to Uzbekistan in proportion
to their role in the international community. The United States of Amer-
ica is a country of enduring importance  to  Uzbekistan given the  role  it
has played in the past in the international community and given its
promise  for the  future. The  US is a state  that should be  understood
realistically in terms of the attributes of its own foreign policy. The most
recent decade has witnessed a great deal of discussion and debate about
the  purposes of American foreign policy. Because  of its influence  in the
international community, the United States tends to be more proactive
in its foreign policy than other states. But even a proactive state because
of conditions in the international community may range between innova-
tive and conventional policies.
 The thesis of this article is that there are aspects of American foreign
policy that are highly innovative and there are aspects that are highly
traditional. Understanding them requires comprehension of both the in-
ternational community and the  unique  features of the  American position
in the community. This article explains aspects of innovation and tradi-
tion in American foreign policy in terms of three topics. The article first
surveys the  unique  features of American political development in terms
of the  influence  on foreign policy. The  discussion of the  unique  features
of the American experience discuses America’s unusual historical devel-
opment as essentially anti-colonial and anti-imperial country. Second, the
1 “Имею желание купить дом, но не имею возможности. Имею возможность купить козу, но... не имею желания. Так
выпьем за то, чтобы наши желания всегда совпадали с нашими возможностями!” Кавказская пленница.  Мосфильм, 1967.
Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies
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article offers an interpretation of the American experience in terms of
some leading strategic or “systems” perspectives. The discussion of Amer-
ica’s role in the global system emphasizes interpretations in strategic
thinking regarding the different role of the US before and after the
Second World War and through the end of the Cold War as the USSR
came to an end. Finally, the article offers some suggestions for under-
standing the importance of American foreign policy for Uzbekistan in the
current and rapidly evolving world order, influenced today more  by emerg-
ing digital technologies than the industrial technologies which shaped the
global strategic configuration for the  past two centuries.
American Foreign Policy—Then, Today and Tomorrow
The United States of America was legally and technically formed as a
single state only in 1787, originally described in the US Constitution as
the “united States of America”, with the term “united” being initially
uncapitalized and used as an adjective rather than a part of the name of
the country. The establishment of a centralized American government
came eleven years after the states had broken away from British overrule.
But even before the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the idea of an
American political society distinct from its European legacy had emerged.
Today, it is possible to think of the United States of America as having a
history of a political community of roughly 250 years. Of the entire
historical record, one way to understand American foreign policy is to
regard it has having two distinctive phases. One phase was before 1941
and one phase came after 1945. There is continuity between these two
phases, but the differences are more important.
In terms of the first phase, American political leaders from the first
days in the life of the republic were regarded as breaking with well-
established cannons of political practice  in Europe. The  American repub-
lic, after all, was a country forged in the crucible of an anti-colonial
revolution, breaking with ensconced patterns and practices that had long
outlived their utility and rationale. America was the first great experi-
ment in decolonization and the first great undertaking in creating wholly
new forms of governance based upon the values and goals of visionary
thinkers. America was born as a country of immigrants, populated by
people who had left the Old World behind in order to escape severity,
privation and subjection. Born as a people’s republic in a revolution against
monarchical absolutism and the ensconced privileges of aristocracy, Amer-
ica was forged in the foundry of egalitarian individual rights and individ-
ual initiative. The new American republic had little interest in the con-
G. Gleason
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flicts and political travail of the Old World. As America’s first Secretary
of State, Thomas Jefferson, summed up America’s purposes abroad, he
said the  purpose  of this new country in foreign affairs was the  pursuit of
“peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling
alliances with none.”[1].
One important aspect of the American experience is the consolidation
and expansion of the American republic. American consolidation followed
a path very unlike  the  paths of colonial expansion which were  by Euro-
pean countries in other parts of the  world. Endowed by ample  natural
resources and separated from other countries of the  Old World by great
oceans and great distances, America developed through the eighteenth,
the  nineteenth, and the  first part of the  twentieth century as a country
very different from the colonial and post-colonial “Great Powers” of Eu-
rope and Asia. America tended to be in most respects what people regard
as an “isolationist” power, concerned primarily with its own well-being
rather than foreign relations. American foreign policy may have been
proactive at time with its northern and southern neighbors, but it was
primarily reactive with respect to other countries around the world. Even
as America prospered as a country and its resources grew to  be  adequate
to extend its influence beyond its borders, Americans were generally
resistant to the ideas of empire and foreign influence. In the 18th and 19th
centuries the  great imperial powers of Europe  had extended their influ-
ence and built their wealth on colonial expansion. America was an excep-
tion. In the early years, the American union was consumed basically with
continental issues, linked first by waterways and later railroad construc-
tion that reached out to the west. America’s first great expansion was the
purchase  from France  in 1803 of the  Lou-
isiana territories for $15 million. One of
the first doctrinal statements of Ameri-
can foreign policy was the Monroe Doc-
trine. In Monroe’s message to Congress,
December 2, 1823, he stated two things,
the first of which is remembered and the
second of which is often forgotten or ig-
nored. Monroe stated that American con-
tinents should not be considered sub-
jects for future  colonization by any Eu-
ropean power. He also stated the US
should not intervene  in Europe.
At the time of Monroe’s statement, Spain still claimed Mexico and
much of the American west coast as a colonial possession.  After Mexicans
The most important change in
American foreign policy is the shift
from a reactive posture to a
proactive posture that was
produced by the Second World War.
Before the war, American political
instincts were essentially
isolationist. After the war, America
emerged as a different country,
shouldering international
responsibilities that it did not itself
create but it could not ignore.
Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies
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declared independence from Spain in 1821, competition broke out be-
tween the US and Mexico over Texas and California.  The US recognized
Texas in 1837 and Texas in 1845 joined the Union.  In 1846 Congress
settled the Oregon Treaty, dividing the Northwestern Territory with Brit-
ain along the 49th parallel, a straight line separating Canada from the US.
The same year Congress declared war on Mexico over California and in
1848 the war came to an end with the US paying Mexico $18M for
California.  The  southern part of Arizona and New Mexico  was purchased
from Mexico  in 1853 by the  Gadsen purchase  in which Mexico  was paid
$10M for the territory. In 1859 Russia’s Alexander II offered the sale of
Alaska to the U.S., in part out of apprehensions that Britain might seek
to  capture  the  territories. The  US civil war interrupted these  discus-
sions, but Russian diplomats recommenced in 1867 and the  US met Rus-
sia’s asking price of $7.2M. In 1898 the US declared war on Spain over
Cuba and destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila.  Defeated Spain ceded
control over Cuba, Puerto  Rico, Guam, and the  Philippines to  the  US in
exchange for $20M.  At the same time, the US annexed Hawaii after the
Hawaiian government was overthrown in a rebellion. America also ac-
quired Samoa as a result of an agreement with Germany. In 1901 the
“Cuba Convention” made Cuba a US protectorate.  Louisiana, Califor-
nia, Alaska, southern Arizona and New Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and Philippines, in other words, the  great bulk of America’s expansion to
the  west, to  the  north, to  the  south was territory purchased, not cap-
tured in colonial conquest.  
This is a sharp contrast with the  European colonial empires. Spain and
Portugal pioneered exploration and the territorial acquisition of colonies.
They were followed by England, France, the Netherlands, Germany and
Russia. Large parts of the globe were held in the hands of the colonial
empires until the rise of competition. Those colonial empires were built
on territorial occupation, annexation, domination and other ruses, but not
by purchases.
Another sharp contrast with the experience of other countries is im-
mediately apparent from the  map alone. Surveying the  outlines of the  50
states on the map, one sees a collection of borders, some of which are
straight lines and some of which are complicated and uneven lines. As one
looks closer at the uneven lines, it becomes clear that in all of America,
the  uneven lines are  divisions defined by the  course  of rivers or lakes.
Kentucky’s uneven norther border, for instance, is defined by the  course
of the Ohio river. Indiana’s uneven western border is defined by the
Mississippi river. Washington’s uneven southern border is defined by the
Columbia river. One of the few uneven lines not defined by water is
G. Gleason
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Montana’s border with Idaho, which is defined by a crest line. But this
exception tends to prove the rule. Most borders in the US between the
states are straight lines, created by compact. The difference between
other countries around the world and the US is apparent by looking at a
map. There  are  virtually no  straight lines between countries in Europe
where borders are the result of long-standing and frequently challenged
agreements between territorial powers.
Border Contours of the 50 States of the USA
Source: This map is in the  public domain. See  https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blank_US_map_borders.svg
The most important change in American foreign policy is the shift
from a reactive  posture  to  a proactive  posture  that was produced by the
Second World War. Before the war, American political instincts were
essentially isolationist. After the war, America emerged as a different
country, shouldering international responsibilities that it did not itself
create but it could not ignore. America played a key role in designing and
Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies
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financing the world’s most important international institutions, including
the UN, the World Bank, and numerous other international institutions.
America exerted a leading role in shaping the post-War international
order and helping to bring an end to the domination of the countries of
Central Europe  by the  Soviet bloc. America by example  set standards of
policy and practice. America became one of the world’s most ardent
sponsors of international foreign assistance, foreign aid. America found a
course  in international affairs that had an almost magnetic attraction for
other countries as a world leader in technology, and a model for many
other countries of an efficient, popular, successful, self-governing, and
democratic system.
The rivalry between the US and the closest competitor, the USSR,
however, quickly split the world into two competing camps. Roosevelt’s
“Great Design” of four international policemen (America, England, Rus-
sia, and China) wavered briefly and then collapsed under the  pressure  of
events. New international organizations came into being. The United
Nations—less powerful than the League of Nations but more influen-
tial—was created. International organizations for standardizing policy and
practice for world’s economy were created. The unwillingness of the
Soviet leadership to  demobilize  and withdraw troops from Eastern Eu-
rope  and from Iran, Greece, and Turkey convinced the  western world
that new competition was both military and ideological; it was a competi-
tion of ideas as well as armies. Speaking in Fulton, Missouri in February
1946, at a graduation ceremony at Fulton College, Winston Churchill
warned that “an Iron Curtain” had descended upon Europe.
The fall of the Czechoslovakian government to a communist faction
and the refusal of the Soviet Union to demobilize its armies in the other
East European regimes led to  a renewed western resolve  to  contain and
roll-back the influence of communism. Then came 1949; the “year of
shocks.” In April 1949, Soviet leaders closed western access to most of
Berlin, precipitating the  Berlin crisis. In response, Western governments
airlifted 1.5 million tons of material supplies to the citizens of the west-
ern sector of Berlin in the “Berlin Airlift.” In August 1949, the Federal
Republic of Germany was officially established with the national capital
situated in Bonn. But the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny did not recognize a division into two countries, East and West Germa-
ny. Many Germans anticipated the  day when the  country might be  reu-
nited.
In the atmosphere of Cold War confrontation, the United States
began devising ways to deal with threats from the Soviet Union. These
efforts gave  the  basic structure  to  American ideological, political, eco-
G. Gleason
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nomic, and foreign policies for the next
half century. With the  test of the  first
Soviet nuclear device in 1949, the Cold
War escalated. Much of the political
history of the period between 1949 and
1991 was structured by the  Cold War
competition. A leading historian of the
Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, spoke
of the “geopolitical operational codes”
which formed the doctrinal basis for
America’s response to the Soviet Un-
ion’s policies. Gaddis cites a number of
specific phases: 1) the Truman Doc-
trine and containment (1947-49); the
“roll-back” period guided by the  thinking of National Security Council
Directive 68 (1950-53); the “New Look” (1953-61); the policy of “flexi-
ble response” (1961-69); and “detente” (early 1970s), the renewed Cold
War (1979-1985), and perestroika (1986-1991) [2].
Despite the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet cooperation continued in some
spheres. The spirit of detente culminated with a conference in Helsinki,
Finland, in 1975 called the  Conference  on Security and Cooperation in
Europe  (CSCE). The  Soviet Union participated in the  conference  seek-
ing to  gain diplomatic recognition of the  borders of the  East European
countries, borders that were never officially recognized after the conclu-
sion of the  Second World War. The  US diplomats sought international
security, economic cooperation, and political liberalization. This last cat-
egory, political liberalization, came to be known as “basket three” in
negotiations because the issues were packaged together as an addendum
to  the  more  pressing security and economic issues. These  provisions
included respect for human rights, freedom of conscience, national identi-
fication, and the right to repatriation of divided families. The meeting
concluded with the singing of the “Helsinki Final Act.” Human rights
concerns eventually became  the  most significant enduring feature  of the
dialogue between East and West that continued under the auspices of
CSCE follow-up conferences for twenty years until, in 1995, the confer-
ence  participants formally reconstituted the  organization as the  Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  (OSCE).
Soviet communism was based on the doctrine that a new proletarian
experiment would sweep the entire world and would become the ruling
form of government and then replace traditional forms of government by
eliminating government entirely. The Soviet system evolved in a very
Historically, major reshaping of the
international community tended to
come after major conflict. One thinks
of the Peace of Westphalia, the
Congress or Vienna, the Paris Peace,
or the establishment of the post WW-II
order. In these historical examples,
the international community faced the
challenge of making peace after war.
But after the disintegration of
communism, the peacemakers had a
different challenge: the problem of
securing peace in the midst of peace.
Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies
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different way, however. In the early years
the idea of world communism was replaced
by the idea of “socialism in one country”
and eventually the Soviet system devel-
oped into a nuclear superpower rivaling
the US and western countries in one
sphere—military capacity.
The Soviet model proved to be too
brittle for evolution and too resistant to
internal change. Gradually the inflexibil-
ity of the system brought it to denoue-
ment. The international community after
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became much more complex than that
of fifty years before. Historically, major reshaping of the international
community tended to come after major conflict. One thinks of the Peace
of Westphalia, the Congress or Vienna, the Paris Peace, or the establish-
ment of the post WW-II order. In these historical examples, the interna-
tional community faced the challenge of making peace after war. But
after the disintegration of communism, the peacemakers had a different
challenge: the  problem of securing peace  in the  midst of peace.
The military arena of competition was underscored by a political and
ideological competition defined by values and goals but also by associa-
tions and alliances that defined “East” and “West”. The military and
political arenas of competition were  further underscored by an economic
competition over models of production, commerce, trade and develop-
ment. As the USSR came to an end, much of the attractiveness of the
socialist model was abandoned and the momentum of the Cold War peri-
od was picked up by the countries favoring the Western model, led, to a
large extent, by the direction charted by the United States. In the
twilight of the receding Soviet superpower, expectations grew that Amer-
ica would follow the Cold War with a period of accelerating preeminence,
establishing a “unipolar” world order with America exerting hegemonic
control on a global level. But the expectations of a rapid rise of American
global dominance were greatly exaggerated. American foreign policy in
the wake of the Soviet denouement were essentially oriented toward
continuity and incremental change rather than transformation. As the
Clinton administration came into office in early 1993, the policies it
pursued only incrementally reduced the  military arena, while  the  efforts
in political and economic arenas put greater emphasis on practices and
institutions conforming to the Western model of the “Washington con-
sensus.” [3].
In the twilight of the receding
Soviet superpower, expectations
grew that America would follow
the Cold War with a period of
accelerating preeminence,
establishing a “unipolar” world
order with America exerting
hegemonic control on a global
level. But the expectations of a
rapid rise of American global
dominance were greatly
exaggerated.
G. Gleason
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When the Bush administration came into office in early 2001 the
initial focus was on enhancing America’s military, political and economic
arenas through greater effectiveness, but the Bush administration was
soon pressed to  meet a wholly unanticipated challenge  by the  attacks
targeted on the US by terrorists. The idea the military must be prepared
to face a “big war” was pushed aside and many analysts recalculated on
the  threats posed by terrorists, insurgents and by small local wars. The
events of September 11, 2001 changed the  script for the  foreign policy of
the Bush administration. The Global War on Terrorism essentially repre-
sented a shift from defense to offense. Rather than crouching in a defen-
sive huddle, the Bush administration elected to take the fight to the
enemy. Offensive actions, of any kind, are generally more expensive than
defensive operations. But a well-defined and well-executed offense can
also be the best defense. To a large extent the global war on terror
achieved the defensive goal for the United States. Other attacks on the
United States on the scale of the Bin Laden attack were apparently
plotted, but none succeeded. However, at the same time the actions of
the global war on terror did not succeed in transforming the economic and
political terrain in the countries where the terrorist networks were based.
The Obama administration came into office in January 2009 with a set
of seemingly intractable economic problems from a wrenching financial
crisis. Obama administration officials had campaigned on criticism of
American foreign military engagements. Adopting a series of cautious con-
flict-averse steps in foreign policy soon gained critics who saw Obama’s
policies as constituting retrenchment. But America was dealing with the
costs of adjustment from the changes that globalization and the dominat-
ing role of global trade had thrust on America. Much of America’s heavy
industry had shifted abroad during the  previous two decades. Free  trade
policies made it possible for American investors to seek dividends from
investment in manufacturing and production in other countries. This as-
pect of globalization worked well for the investors. But the enthusiasm of
free markets which buoyed Wall Street consistently played against the
interests of Main Street. In past generations, American heavy industry had
made America an industrial juggernaut. But now the jobs of heavy indus-
try had vanished abroad, leaving a new generation of American workers
questioning many of the  principles of global economic liberalism.
As the Trump administration came into office in early 2017 the focus
immediately was fixed on reversing many of the trends of the previous
three decades, rebuilding the economic factors that had made America
the  leading industrial country of the  20th century, restoring the  levels of
employment, social stability and political satisfaction which had become
Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies
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so characteristic of the United States. The Trump administration sought
to reestablish America’s role abroad as a country which needed to be
respected even if not feared. The  Trump administration began pursuing an
extremely active  diplomatic agenda but not an extended agenda. Admin-
istration officials were looking for leverage more than engagement. Ad-
dressing top executives of the world’s largest energy companies and oil
ministers in Houston, Pompeo said in prepared remarks that America’s
newfound shale  oil and natural gas abundance  would “strengthen our
hand in foreign policy.” [4]. But with respect to  many principled issues
the administration was forthright and blunt. As regards the Ukrainian
problem, Secretary Pompeo plainly and unambiguously stated, “The United
States reiterates its unwavering position: Crimea is Ukraine and must be
returned to  Ukraine’s control.”[5]. As regards Cuban prevarication, Sec-
retary Pompeo lambasted the “national referendum” on revisions to the
constitution. Pompeo stated, “No one should be fooled by this exercise,
which achieves little beyond perpetuating the pretext for the regime’s
one-party dictatorship. The  entire  process has been marked by carefully
managed political theater and repression of public debate.”[6].
America’s recent foreign policy posture  during the  Trump administra-
tion has come  as a surprise  to  some  who expected that surprises from
American foreign policy would come  as incremental changes of course,
pursuing minor adjustments in functioning rather than systematic trans-
formation. These expectations were based on the fact that in recent years
the Republican party was regarded as the conservative party and the
Democratic party was regarded as the liberal party. Conservatives have
traditionally been viewed as cautious, status-quo defenders and liberals
have been viewed as activist promoters of change. But the administration
of Donald Trump has fundamentally changed the way that people think
of American government and American foreign policy. This invites us to
reassess our approach to  both policy and practice.
Strategic Theory and World Order
Conventional approaches to explaining the behavior and predicting
the  future  steps of major actors tend to  be  rooted in international rela-
tions strategic theories. Conventional theories fall into three schools;
realism, liberalism and Marxism. These theories are typically represented
as systems of ideas, but in reality, they are deeply rooted in the socio-
economic conditions of the industrial revolution. It is important to bear
in mind that the  impact of the  current information revolution is now
surpassing the  legacy of the  industrial revolution.
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Realism is a way of thinking which has its origins in ancient thinkers
such as Thucydides and Sun-Tsu. But realism in its modern form is very
much a product of the legal definitions of the Grotian system married to
the realities of the industrial revolution and the rise of the modern state.
For the realists the state is the pri-
mary actor in the system. The state
pursues its interests and seeks to  en-
hance  either security or influence  or
power [7]. Realists think of the con-
temporary international system as a field
of competing units of various sizes and
capabilities, struggling by means of
strategies of self-advancement to
achieve goals that are sometimes com-
mon, sometimes contradictory. Large
and resourceful states can achieve  their
goals through partnership, influence, alliance, demand, and coercion. Small
and less resourceful states find the  strategies at their disposal more  con-
strained. Hence  small states are  encouraged by realist doctrine  to  pur-
sue strategies of aggregation, coalition-formation and integration.
Other schools of strategic thought put more emphasis on the impor-
tance of collective goals and international cooperation driving factors in
defining the contemporary international systems. Neoliberalism is the
idea that the state is a constellation of interests acting within a field of
cooperation and avoidance, seeking gains or avoiding losses [8]. Neo-liber-
als regard the nation-state as the primary actor and primary platform, but
generally endorse greater roles for international organizations, multilater-
al institutions and international law. However, it is important that liber-
als and neo-liberals do not question the components of the systems or the
legitimacy of the actors in general. The international state system is itself
not questioned, but the  way it works in the  pursuit of peace  and prosper-
ity is the focus of liberal attention.
Realism and liberalism, in all the brands and versions, are counter-
posed by Marxism. Marx was a amateur anthropologist, a sociologically-
oriented political economist, and an activist ideologist. Marx’s ideas are
basically rooted in the social and political milieu of the most concentrated
period of the industrial revolution. Marx’s theories drove him toward
simple explanations of social conflict. Marx thought that history proceed-
ed in stages and earlier hunter-gatherer, agricultural, and trading societies
had been built on scavenging, plunder, predatory trading with foreigners,
or feudal exactions. Marx thought the capitalism of the industrial world
America’s recent foreign policy
posture during the Trump
administration has come as a surprise
to some who expected that surprises
from American foreign policy would
come as incremental changes of
course, pursuing minor adjustments
in functioning rather than systematic
transformation. This invites us to
reassess our approach to both policy
and practice.
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was different in the sense that it built prosperity on new industrial pro-
duction, bringing new value into the world. The goal of the proletarian
revolution, Marx reasoned, would be to appropriate this value for the
good of the workers. Marx’s views on exploitation brought him to a
particularly strident interpretation of the  nature  of the  international
system in the  mid-19th century. He  saw the  governments of Western
Europe  as nothing more  than executive  committees of the  rich propped
up by the symbols and slogans of nationalism to rationalize the distribu-
tion of property in the interests of the wealthy. Government, Marx ar-
gued, was an integument that the wealthy created to protect itself from
the un-landed and un-propertied masses. Marx believed that his theories
were  as much a prescription as a diagnosis. The  philosophers of the  past,
he said, «have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is,
however, to change it.» [9]
Strategic thinkers whether from the realist, liberal and Marxian or
other perspectives, see the recent period of history in American foreign
policy as hard to explain. Asserting that America’s ends exceeded its
means, some scholars concluded that America reached a period of “impe-
rial overreach”, as did Paul Kennedy argued in his book The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers [10]. Such is the thesis argued by Andrew
Bacevich in his The Limits of Power [11]. Some analysts see the changes
that are taking place in terms of socioeconomic processes, not necessar-
ily the foreign policies of any particular states. Contemplating the end
of the  bipolar configuration, Francis Fukyama argued the  most impor-
tant ideological conflicts would come to an end as democracy, market-
oriented politics, and international standards of policy and practice
grew to  be  universally accepted [12]. Other analysts anticipated differ-
ent changes, calling attention to  the  emergence  of cultural conflicts in
terms of a “clash of civilizations” as Samuel Huntington argued in 1993
in the  pages of one  of the  most influential journals, Foreign Affairs,
claiming “The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines
of the  future.” [13].
Some  scholars maintained that the  structure  of the  international
system is what determines state behavior. If the global order changes,
state behavior changes accordingly. John Mearsheimer argued that as the
Cold War came  to  an end many policy makers and academics anticipated
a new era of peace and prosperity, an era in which democracy and open
trade would herald the «end of history.» According to Mearsheimer,
great power politics are always tragic because the anarchy of the interna-
tional system requires states to seek dominance at one another’s expense,
dooming even peaceful nations to a relentless power struggle. Mearsheim-
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er surveys modern great power struggles and reflects on the  bleak pros-
pects for peace  in Europe  and northeast Asia, arguing that US security
competition with a rising China can be expected to intensify [14].
Some scholars have drawn attention to the changing role of America
in the modern international community, asserting that America is not in
decline but that “everyone else is rising” as Fareed Zakaria argued in his
The Post-American World [15]. Some observ-
ers see  a world in which the  principal compe-
tition is among nation-states pursuing their tra-
ditional goals but in a non-traditional context;
a context in which, as Robert Kagan has ex-
pressed it, “we have entered an age of diver-
gence” [16]. Some scholar have maintained that
the global system is deeper, broader and more
equilibrating that it appears. Hal Brands ar-
gued, “the United States’ post–Cold War grand strategy has not marked
a radical departure  from the  country’s previous statecraft; it has not been
a catastrophic failure, and it has not been irrevocably overtaken by global
power shifts. Rather, the United States’ post–Cold War approach has
been rooted firmly in its successful post-war strategic tradition, and it has
been broadly effective in molding the international system to Washing-
ton’s liking [17].
The outcome of the US presidential election in 2016 was unexpected
by many foreign observers of American policy. The first two years of
Donald Trump’s administration underscored several values and objectives
that have long been held by substantial groups in the US but, at the
same time, charted a direction which seemed to undercut many of the
fundamental principles and institutions of foreign relations in previous
years. The withdraw from many multilateral trade agreements, the crit-
icism of trade partners as well as alliance partners, the withdrawal from
former commitments with respect to treaties designed to contain the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, the
abandonment of popular climate control initiatives, made it abundantly
clear that US foreign policy had entered a new phase which is not simply
a continuation of the past. As Kori Schake, of London’s International
Institute for Strategic Studies, pointed out recently, “President Donald
Trump’s sharp-elbowed nationalism, opposition to multilateralism and
international institutions, and desire to shift costs onto US allies reflect
the American public’s understandable weariness with acting as the global
order’s defender and custodian.” [18]. Schake explained that American
voters no longer saw the benefit in financially shoring up international
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American foreign policy as
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institutions that seemed to  serve  their own institutional purposes rather
than national purposes or even commercial purposes.
How do we explain these recent changes in the global order? In the
brief introduction to his book World Order, Henry Kissinger offered a
succinct analysis of differing values, assumptions and proclivities as they
affect international security in contemporary circumstances. Kissinger argued
that, despite the fact that we frequently speak about the “international
community” and make references to the idea of a “world order”, in fact
“no truly global world order has ever existed” [19]. “What passes for
order in our time, “ Kissinger argued, “was devised in Western Europe
nearly four centuries ago, at a peace  conference  in the  German region of
Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of
most other continents or civilizations.” Kissinger explained, “The West-
phalian peace reflected a practical accommodation to reality, not a unique
moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from
interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s
ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”[20].
The  Westphalian system endured to  this day, to  be  sure  with many
flaws, to become the foundation for the assumptions of the international
system exemplified by the UN and other institutions of global governance.
These institutions re-emerged after WWII in a more robust form to shape
the  present basic global security architecture. But that architecture,
Kissinger argued, was not shared with the same Westphalian assumptions
and principles by everyone. Kissinger reflected that “At the  opposite  end
of the  Eurasian landmass from Europe, China was the  center of its own
hierarchical and theoretically universal concept of order. This system had
operated for millennia—it had been in place when the Roman Empire
governed Europe  as a unity—basing itself not on the  sovereign equality
of states but on the presumed boundlessness of the Emperor’s reach. In
this concept, sovereignty in the  European sense  did not exist, because
the Emperor held sway over ‘All under Heaven’.” [21]. Kissinger stressed,
“In much of the  region between Europe  and China, Islam’s different
universal concept of world order held sway, with its own vision of a single
divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world.” Final-
ly, Kissinger pointed to the emergence of a distinct version of world order
that evolved out of the  “New World” in the  17th century in which “the
American vision rested not on an embrace  of the  European balance-of-
power system but on the achievement of peace through the spread of
democratic principles.”[22]. Today many people  in professional diplo-
matic circles openly wonder whether the  field of diplomacy has not wit-
nessed a “take-off” point at which a qualitative  change  has occurred and
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many of the  time-honored and established principles of the  Westphalian
world order are outdated.
We often forget that the economic and political categories we use are
associated with technological stages. For instance, Marxism is often re-
garded as an ideological world view that defines how people behave in
economic and political respects. But there is a strong argument that what
Marx’s theories describe is less an ideological consequence than a result
of the industrial revolution that established the conditions for a vast
“proletarian” working class in contradistinction to an enfranchised prop-
erty-owning class. Marxism is a product of the industrial revolution.
Without the industrial revolution, there could be no Marxist revolution.
There is a new technological revolution now—the information revolution.
The information revolution is in the process now of reshaping societies in
a way that is creating entirely new social, economic and consequently
political relations. New ways to strategically understand foreign policy
will need to take these technological developments into account.
American Foreign Policy and Uzbekistan
The  days of the  territorially-based politics of the  19th century are  over
even if some of the habits of the world of imperial contests tend to
persist. The historical role of the US is important in this context. The US
is not an Empire; it is not a colonial power; and it is not an expansionist
system. The US regards sovereign countries as being entitled to territorial
integrity, the right to non-interference in domestic affairs, and the right
to determine their own policies, associations, alliances and definitions of
national interest. The US does not support the idea of “special spheres of
influence” which relegate some countries to “second class sovereignty.”
Historically the record is clear. The US does not support the concept of
spheres of influence; it never has and it is not likely that it ever will.
This is a period of great opportunity for cooperative foreign policies.
Two things are important. One is having robust forms of interaction
that can build mutual understanding. The knowledge of Uzbekistan in
the  American political community was severely circumscribed during
the  20th century. The  work of great practitioners and scholars such as
Eugene Schuler [23], Geoffrey Wheeler [24], Alexander Bennigsen,
Edward Allworth, Shirin Akiner and others led a dynamic generation of
American scholars such as Nancy Lubin and Martha Brill Olcott. The
indefatigable work of S. Frederick Starr provided insight into the roots
of Central Asia policy [25] and continues to  play a critical role  in future
policy [26]. Marlene Laruelle and others have helped to build an in-
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formed and talented cadre of specialists from the new generation [27].
The search for cooperative strategy is to a large extent founded in
mutual understanding. The  better we  can enhance  our insight into  the
goals and resources of partners, the  more  likely we  can promote  fur-
ther cooperation.
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